TEA AND SYMPATHY: HIGH COURT BACKS RELIGION LAW
This Time, Ruling in Religious Drug-Use Case Favors Sacramental Rites
BY DAVID L. HUDSON JR.
The recent feud between Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court over the level of protection for religious practice was stoked byperhaps more than any other issuethe right to use psychotropic drugs in religious ceremonies.
In 1990, the court ruled in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, that two Native American drug counselors could be denied unemployment benefits for their use of peyote. That decision sparked the congressional passage of the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which imposed a high standard when a law may burden someones exercise of his or her religion.
Although other cases have sketched the boundaries of First Amendment free exercise rights, it was another religious drug-use case that this week marked the latest volley. This time, however, the Supreme Court backed Congress, in a decision some hailed as a victory for religious liberty.
In a unanimous ruling Tuesday, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. affirmed a preliminary injunction preventing the federal government from enforcing a ban on a churchs use of a sacramental tea containing a hallucinogen. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, No. 04-1084.
The ruling was a "thumping victory for religious accommodation laws," says Anthony Picarello, president and general counsel for the Washington, D.C.-based Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, which filed an amicus brief in support of the church. "Its especially good news for religious minorities," he adds.
However, Marci Hamilton, a law professor at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York City, criticizes the courts decision, calling Congress law "an invitation [for courts] to walk through Alice in Wonderlands looking glass."
The most recent case revolves around a Brazilian-based church with about 130 members in the U.S. Nicknamed UDV for Uniao Do Vegetal, its members receive communion through hoasca, a tea made from two plants, one of which contains dimethyltryptamine, a hallucinogen.
In 1999, federal agents raided the New Mexico home of a church member who had three drums of the tea. The officials seized the tea and threatened prosecution, saying the tea contained material prohibited by the federal Controlled Substances Act.
The church sued the U.S. attorney general and other federal law enforcement officials, contending that the application of the federal drug laws to the religious use of their sacramental tea violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Congress passed the law in response to Employment Division v. Smith, in which the court ruled that generally applicable regulations, such as drug laws, that do not target religious practices do not violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.
RFRA requires the government to meet a high standard when it applies a law that may substantially burden the exercise of a persons religion: The government must show a compelling interest that limits religious liberty in the least restrictive means.
In the UDV case, the government asserted that enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act furthered three such compelling interests: protecting the health and safety of the church members, preventing the diversion of the tea from church usage to general recreational usage, and ensuring compliance with a 1971 treaty on regulating psychotropic drugs.
The government contended that it did not have to meet RFRAs strict-scrutiny test at the preliminary injunction stage. However, a federal district court in New Mexico granted the injunction, which was affirmed by the Denver-based 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in divided three-judge and en banc rulings. The government appealed to the Supreme Court.
Roberts and the other justices upheld the lower courts, saying that the "burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial."
Wrote Roberts: "Congress express decision to legislate the compelling interest test indicates that RFRA challenges should be adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally mandated applications of the test, including at the preliminary injunction stage."
The government also argued that it needed uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act and that a religious exception would create a slippery slope that could lead to more exceptions. However, Roberts said, "The governments argument echoes the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, Ill have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions."
Roberts also pointed out that the 1994 American Indian Religious Freedom Act amendments created a "peyote exception" from the Controlled Substances Act to all members of recognized Indian tribes.
"If such use is permitted
for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans practicing their faith, it is difficult to see how those same findings alone can preclude any consideration of a similar exception for the 130 or so American members of the UDV who want to practice theirs," he wrote.
"RFRA makes clear that it is the obligation of the courts to consider whether exceptions are required under the test set forth by Congress," Roberts explained.
The court also reasoned that the government did not satisfy its burden with respect to its argument that granting the exception would have negative consequences with regard to the treaty on psychotropic drugs.
"At the present stage, it suffices to observe that the government did not even submit evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an exception for the UDV," Roberts wrote (emphasis in original).
Becket Fund president Picarello says, "Religion-specific accommodationslike a statute that provides a day off for Christmashelp only those religious groups with the political clout to get them passed through the legislature. But broad religious freedom protections like RFRA tend to protect majority and minority religions alike. So when they are enforced vigorouslyespecially in a case involving a religious minorityits good news for people of all faiths.
"Also, the decision all but dooms constitutional challenges to RFRA as applied to the federal government," Picarello adds. "These have been rarer and weaker as time has passed, but there are still some out there, and this pretty much finishes them off."
John Boyd of Albuquerque, N.M., one of the attorneys for the church, says he is delighted that the decision was unanimous.
"The decision makes clear that the Supreme Court has taken Congress at its word," he says. "The statute means what it says, and the government will have to actually prove a compelling interest and the adoption of least restrictive means whenever it interferes with religious conduct. The religious groups who weighed in on our side see this decision as important because it rejects the view of the executive that there are certain areas of government regulation that should be beyond the reach of the RFRA balancing test."
However, Hamilton, who wrote an amicus brief in the case arguing that RFRA is unconstitutional, says RFRA "forces courts into second-guessing legislatures. And it does so in arenas Congress never even contemplated when it passed RFRA. It never occurred to the members of Congress that it was opening the door for religious groups to violate the Controlled Substances Act, beyond the Native American churchs use of peyote. Now, the courts are supposed to assess whether the government has a compelling interest and engaged the least restrictive means with respect to a religious practice it did not even know existed when it enacted the generally applicable, neutral law."
Hamilton, who successfully convinced the court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments, stresses that the ruling was at the preliminary injunction stage, not on the final merits.
"As a procedural matter, this case was a preliminary judgment motion, not a final ruling on the merits," she says. "Nothing in the decision forbids a lower court from being persuaded by the government once it has engaged in discovery and taken depositions."