Yogman v. Parrott has a robust analysis of "commercial enterprise". Quoting in part:
We next consider whether defendants' rental activity constitutes a “commercial enterprise.” “Commercial” means, as relevant, “occupied with or engaged in commerce * * * [;] related to or dealing with commerce.” Id. at 456. “Commerce,” in turn, means “the exchange or buying and selling of commodities esp. on a large scale”; but it also can mean “dealings of any kind.” Ibid. “Commercial” also can mean “having profit as the primary aim.” Ibid. “Enterprise” can mean “VENTURE, UNDERTAKING, [OR] PROJECT”; “a business organization: FIRM [OR] COMPANY”; or, simply, “any systematic purposeful activity.” Id. at 757.
If a “commercial enterprise” is any undertaking or systematic purposeful activity involving business dealings of any kind, then the covenant covers defendants' use of the property, because the short-term vacation rentals systematically and purposefully generate revenue from arm's-length transactions. On the other hand, if a “commercial enterprise” requires a business organization that has profit as its primary aim, then the covenant does not cover defendants' use, [emphasis added] because the facts shown do not demonstrate that defendants are a business organization or that they have profit as their primary aim (as would be true, for example, of a bed-and-breakfast business). Because of the different possible meanings of “commercial enterprise,” this portion of the restrictive covenant also is ambiguous. [emphasis added]
Since the
DVC POS specifically calls out a "pattern of rental activity", the POS clearly is intended to cover renting. However, what constitutes a commercial enterprise of renting remains vague (i.e. "ambiguous"). Therefore, per Y
ogman v. Parrott, the maxim of "strict construction of restrictive covenants" applies. Therefore, we must interpret "commercial enterprise" in its least restrictive form, namely a "business organization that has profit as its primary aim".