ncdisneyfan said:
So can I then assume that you think it is "logical" that a big bang just happened, and life was somehow magically created, as complex as life is, especially human life?
I'm not sure in what sense the first poster to use the term "logical" was using the word. I assume it was meant in a broad sense to mean "reasonable" or "sensible." In its more narrow form it would seem to mean having to do with the subject of logic or following the rules of the subject of logic. But the subject of logic actually has very little to do with the truth of statements and everything to do with the logical relations between statements given the assumption that they are true or false.
So I won't say that logic requires us to believe any particular statement, but I'll try to offer a sensible argument one might give in favor of not believing in a higher being who created us. Suppose our only two options of believing how the universe came about are the big bang and a creator (of course there are tons of other off the wall, but possible, explanations--for example, that aliens from another universe created this universe). Which of these is the better explanation--that's the question. Well, take the big bang as the answer. One problem here is that we still want more explanation--how did the big bang happen? What was here before that? So maybe God looks like a better explanation....BUT wait--suppose God is the answer. Well then we STILL have more questions to ask. How did God happen? What came before God? Did God create him/herself? Of course, the theistic reply to these questions is that nothing came before God, that God is eternal, etc. But if the theist gets to make such claims why can't I say the same thing about the big bang? Nothing came before the big bang. The big bang was the first cause of everything. There was no time before the big bang, etc. The idea is, the chain of causes backwards has to stop somewhere so are we going to stop it at God or are we going to stop it at the big bang (or some other physical event)?
Well one great reason to stop it at the physical event is Okham's Razor (closely associated with the principle of parsimony). These are two significant philosophical principles (and from what I understand, are also important scientific principles). They say, essentially, "Do not multiply entitied beyond necessity" or "stick with the simplest explanation--the one which requires belief in the smallest numbers of kinds of stuff in the world." Here's an example. Suppose my notebook is not on the kitchen table where I left it and I know I didn't move it. Somehow it was moved over to the couch. How did that happen? Well one explanation is that my gf picked it up and moved it. Another is that there is a ghost in the house and the ghost moved it. Which is the better explanation? The girlfriend of course. I already know she exists. I don't have to posit the existence of a thing I didn't already have good reason to believe in if my explanation is that my girlfriend moved it. But if I insist that the ghost must have moved it my explanation requires me to posit the existence of a new being--a ghost--which I didn't believe in before!
Now, of course, it might be the case that there really is a ghost that moved my notebook and by using Okham's razor I'm actually believing a false explanation. This could definitely be the case, but what Okham's razor does is tells us what we are justified in believing, not what is actually the case. (What principle, after all, could tell us for sure what is actually the case?)
One could reject Okham's razor as a good principle of justification of belief in explanations of events, but what principle should replace it? Can I believe anything I like? Anything that makes me happy? Anything I really feel is true in my heart? Unless there's a better principle of when belief is justified, looks like Ockham's razor is a good candidate. Thus, in trying to explain how the universe arose we should pick the explanation which does not force us to believe in entities we didn't already have reason to think existed--i.e. we should belive it was a purely physical event that caused the beginning of the universe.
One might object here that we already do have other reasons to believe in God. I don't know what those reasons would be and I suspect that if they were subject to the Okham's razor test they too might not look like such good reasons after all.