bicker said:
Given that, what cause-and-effect -based bioethical concerns have been raised about this new procedure and/or the use of stem cells in general?
One of the larger objective concerns is in fact Darwinian (which I suppose is also religious) or Dawkins-inian. The short version would state that any species or civilization that increases the emphasis on benefit to the current generation at the expense of future generations will fail. The ethic dilemma is the question does the cure of my personal malady hold more importance than to potential birth of a unknown human? It may be that the answer is yes. But I dont think that its an ethical slam-dunk. Again, speaking in Darwinian terms, successful species are driven toward successful reproduction and the survival of their offspring, first and foremost over and above their own personal survival. According to even neo-Darwinists, this is true of individual members of a species or the species collectively. From that standpoint, IVF is ethical but destroying embryos is not.
Another example is taken from the 2001 report on the subject by UNESCO (The UNs Scientific organization).
23. Amongst modern philosophers, there is an active debate about the philosophical foundation for research into, and use of, embryonic cells precisely because of the potential of the human embryo to develop into a human being with the unique and special qualities inherent in that status. Such debates are not confined to a religious and spiritual context. Philosophers of no religious opinion, and humanists approaching the issues in a wholly secular way, have expressed the need for the development of principles to guide the ethical permissibility of embryonic stem cell research and use.
From Page 9-11
VI. Ethical Arguments: The Status of the Human Embryo
32. The ethical legitimacy of performing human embryonic stem cell research depends, in large measure, on the status which is attributed to the embryo. Although there are other considerations having a bearing on the ethical question - such as the consent of the owners or creators of the embryo (the parents) -, the categorising of the embryo is crucial to the question of what can be done with it. Much of the ethical debate in this area has been taken up with the question of just what the embryo is. If the embryo is a human being (or person), then our treatment of it is limited to that which we are allowed to do to other human beings. If, by contrast, it is no more than a collection of human cells, then there are far fewer restraints on our handling of it. Mid-way views on the embryo allow for varying degrees of restraint on its use.
33. It is clear that the human embryo has a unique status in biological terms. Unlike any other cluster of living cells, it has the capacity to develop into a functioning complex organism that will be substantially differentiated from the entity it once was. This difference may be described as the embryos potential - the potential to become a fully-developed human being. That is, of course, only a biological fact, but it is a biological fact in the face of which we stand in moral awe. In so far as our ethical notions depend upon the valuing of human life, then the human embryo demands respect as the source of the human life to which we attach such significance. But how far should this respect go? Much in nature is respected, but is still used by humankind for its benefit. The real issue is whether the embryo can be brought within full membership of the moral community to which we exclusively admit human persons and human persons alone. If the embryo can be admitted to this community, then it becomes ethically impermissible to use it as a means to an end, and not as an end in itself. More problematic is potential for membership of this community. In one view, the fact that the embryo has the potential to become a human being gives it a particular status, which should protect it from destruction.
34. Arguments about whether the human embryo can be considered a person have been prolonged and marked by a failure to reach agreement. In one view, personhood begins with the fertilisation of the ovum by the sperm; from that moment on, the admittedly primitive organism has an identity which will link it continuously to the infant, to the child, and later to the adult human being it will become. To end the life of the embryo, then, amounts to an ending of the future life of the infant and, indeed, of the child and the adult. Personhood in this view is an ethically significant quality, which human beings have at every stage of their lives, beginning with the embryo and surviving until death brings it to an end.
35. This view of personhood has been challenged by those moral philosophers who see personhood as being dependent on an ability to experience those features of life which lend to life its value and meaning. From the biological point of view, personal individuality can be attributed to the embryo only after the day in its early development when division into normal twins is not possible any more (up to 13 days after-fertilization). Embryos are therefore entitled to respect, but would not enjoy the personhood.
36. A major subject of debate is that of the potentiality of the embryo. The human embryo has the potential to become a person even if it is not yet a person. For this reason, the defenders of a protected embryo status argue that it is wrong to do to the embryo anything that will prevent it from fulfilling this potential. Opponents of this view argue in turn that the potential to become a thing does not give one that status which goes with having become that thing. Ova and sperm are components of the zygote, which later becomes an embryo and then a fetus, but that does not mean that they can enjoy the status appropriate to a zygote or a fetus until that stage of development has been reached. We do not accord fetal status to sperm; why, then, accord human being status to an embryo? Moreover, an embryo resulting from in vitro fertilization, but which will not be implanted in a uterus, has no potential to develop into a human being. The same applies to embryos made by nuclear transfer, which should not be implanted for the purposes of human reproductive cloning.
VII. The Direction of the Debate
37. Any perusal of the debate which has been ongoing over the past few decades about the status of the embryo will reveal that this is an area in which strong convictions have been pitted against one another, and that consensus has usually eluded those who enter the debate from opposing starting points. In these circumstances, one might ask whether it is possible for a body such as the IBC to pronounce on the subject, or whether one might simply conclude that the use of embryos for research purposes is a matter of private conviction. From such a perspective, it might be argued that at a national level, each society should determine what appears to be an acceptable national position and regulate the matter accordingly. This might involve the choosing of that position - facilitative or otherwise - which reflects the majority view, or it might involve a compromise between prohibition and permission, perhaps allowing for embryo research in exceptional circumstances and under very strict control. An alternative is to have no laws on the subject at all and indeed no official ethical position. This would mean that embryo research is left a matter of individual conscience, with the organs of society taking no position on the matter. This last option does not appear at present to attract a great deal of support: there is a widespread view that this area of research needs at least some degree of regulation, and this view is reflected in the increasing tendency for national legislative and governmental bodies and national ethics committees to take a position on human embryo research. In these circumstances, it is appropriate for the International Bioethics Committee to clarify the different positions and indicate their ethical implications.
VIII. The Use of Human Embryos for Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Options
38. In relation to the question of embryonic stem cell research, the IBC confined its attention to the human embryo in its early stages of development and before implantation in the uterus: it did not consider the status of the human fetus implanted in the uterus and further along the line of development that will normally result in birth. This is a separate question on which it was not necessary for the IBC to take a view in this Report.
39. Three principal positions have emerged in the national and international debate on the issue of embryonic stem cell research. These are: (a) the position which holds that use of human embryos for deriving embryonic stem cells is intrinsically unethical, (b) the position which holds that such use is ethically acceptable for certain medical purposes and subject to rigorous safeguards; and (c) the position which considers that, taking into account the present risks linked with this research and its possible ethical drifts (inter alia, the risks of instrumentalization of the embryo), embryonic stem cell research should not be allowed. The IBC recognises that all these positions are ethically intelligible positions to adopt and deserve deeper discussion.
If someone leaves an embryo alone in a woman, it will eventually turn into a baby. Even if it hasn't attached yet, it will get there eventually (in most cases)....
However, if someone leaves an embryo alone in a petri dish, it will never turn into a baby.
I think the above is a specious argument though. If you leave me in a Petri dish (or in this case a closed room with no food or water) I will die but if you leave me where I can obtain food or water I will not. It would not be ethical to leave me with no food or water, but if you do and I die I am not a less valuable human being than one left with food and water.