In September and October 2002 before Senate Committees, senior intelligence officials in response to questions told members of Congress that we differed with the British dossier on the reliability of the uranium reporting.
In October, the Intelligence Community (IC) produced a classified, 90 page National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqs WMD programs. There is a lengthy section in which most agencies of the Intelligence Community judged that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Let me emphasize, the NIEs Key Judgments cited six reasons for this assessment; the African uranium issue was not one of them.
But in the interest of completeness, the report contained three paragraphs that discuss Iraqs significant 550-metric ton uranium stockpile and how it could be diverted while under IAEA safeguard. These paragraphs also cited reports that Iraq began vigorously trying to procure more uranium from Niger and two other African countries, which would shorten the time Baghdad needed to produce nuclear weapons. The NIE states: A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of pure uranium (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out the arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. The Estimate also states: We do not know the status of this arrangement. With regard to reports that Iraq had sought uranium from two other countries, the Estimate says: We cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources. Much later in the NIE text, in presenting an alternate view on another matter, the State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research included a sentence that states: Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INRs assessment, highly dubious.
An unclassified CIA White Paper in October made no mention of the issue, again because it was not fundamental to the judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, and because we had questions about some of the reporting. For the same reasons, the subject was not included in many public speeches, Congressional testimony and the Secretary of States United Nations presentation in early 2003.
The background above makes it even more troubling that the 16 words eventually made it into the State of the Union speech. This was a mistake.
Portions of the State of the Union speech draft came to the CIA for comment shortly before the speech was given. Various parts were shared with cognizant elements of the Agency for review. Although the documents related to the alleged Niger-Iraqi uranium deal had not yet been determined to be forgeries, officials who were reviewing the draft remarks on uranium raised several concerns about the fragmentary nature of the intelligence with National Security Council colleagues. Some of the language was changed. From what we know now, Agency officials in the end concurred that the text in the speech was factually correct - i.e. that the British government report said that Iraq sought uranium from Africa. This should not have been the test for clearing a Presidential address. This did not rise to the level of certainty which should be required for Presidential speeches, and CIA should have ensured that it was removed.