Let's look at the previously cited
Mason Family Trust v. DeVaney.
In summary, the Court found that short-term cabin rentals (by DeVaney) were allowed, despite the deed containing language forbidding "business or commercial purposes".
Quoting in part from this ruling:
The original warranty deeds to properties in the subdivision stated "that said property and the improvements thereon shall be used for dwelling purposes only and that no part thereof shall at any time be used for business or commercial purposes[.]" [emphasis added]
...
Deed restrictions are to be read reasonably but strictly and, to the extent language is unclear or ambiguous, the issue of enforcement of a restriction will be resolved in favor of the free enjoyment of the property and against limitations.
...
While Devaney's renting of the property as a dwelling on a short-term basis may have constituted an economic endeavor on Devaney's part, to construe that activity as one forbidden by the language of the deed restrictions is unreasonable and strained. Strictly and reasonably construed, the deed restrictions do not forbid short-term rental for dwelling purposes. [emphasis added]
...
This conclusion is supported by the case of Yogman v. Parrott, 325 Or. 358, 937 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1997), which involved a short-term vacation rental in a beach-front subdivision. The restrictive wording differs slightly from the present case. The property in Yogman was restricted to use "exclusively for residential purposes" and not for "commercial enterprise." [emphasis added] Id. After analyzing the meanings of "residential," "commercial," and "commercial enterprise," and looking at the context of the restrictive language [emphasis added], the Oregon Supreme Court determined that the language of the restriction was ambiguous. [emphasis added] Id. at 1021-22. Yogman is similar to the present case. Other than limited evidence in Yogman that other homes were used as vacation rentals, there was no evidence in Yogman of the contracting parties' intent. Id. at 1022. The Oregon court followed the principle of strict construction because the use complained of was not "plainly within the provisions of the covenant."
The primary consideration in this case is the "unclear or ambiguous" language of the deed, resulting in the "restriction ... be[ing] resolved in favor of the free enjoyment of the property and against limitations." In other words, by failing to specify what was meant by "business or commercial purpose", the defendant (DeVaney) was entitled to a favorable interpretation.
The deed in
Forshee v. Neuschwander has a similar deficiency as
Mason Family Trust v. DeVaney. Quoting in part from the
Forshee v. Neuschwander decision:
We conclude that the term, "commercial activity," which is undefined in the covenant, is ambiguous. Therefore, we narrowly interpret it and conclude that it does not preclude either short-term or long-term rentals of Neuschwanders' property.
Disney's POS does not suffer from this deficiency. The POS states:
Personal Use. Except for Units owned by DVD, which may be utilized as provided in this Declaration, each of the Vacation Homes shall be occupied only as vacation accommodations. Use of the accommodations and recreational facilities of the Condominium is limited solely to the personal use of Owners, their lessees, guests, exchangers and invitees and for recreational uses by corporations and other entities owning Ownership Interests in a Unit. Use of Vacation Homes and recreational facilities for commercial purposes or any purposes other than the personal use described herein is expressly prohibited. "Commercial purpose" shall include a pattern of rental activity or other occupancy by an Owner that the Association, in its reasonable discretion, could conclude constitutes a commercial enterprise or practice. [emphasis added]
Disney specifies that "'Commercial purpose' shall include a pattern of rental activity or other occupancy by an Owner". Within the context of the POS language, a pattern of renting (reasonably interpreted by Disney) is forbidden. Thus,
Mason Family Trust v. DeVaney and
Forshee v. Neuschwander are not applicable.
You
can rent your DVC points. However, you cannot do so in a pattern that Disney
reasonably concludes is a commercial enterprise or practice.