More
The only source to describe what happened next is Fighting Back by Bill
Sammon. Publishers Weekly described Sammon's book as an "inside account of
the Bush administration's reaction to 9-11 [and] a breathless, highly
complimentary portrait of the president [showing] the great merit and
unwavering moral vision of his inner circle." [Publisher's Weekly, 10/15/02]
Sammon's conservative perspective makes his account of Bush's behavior at the
end of the photo-op all the more surprising. Bush is described as smiling and
chatting with the children "as if he didn't have a care in the world" and "in the
most relaxed manner imaginable." White House aide Gordon Johndroe, then came
in as he usually does at the end of press conferences, and said, "Thank you,
press. If you could step out the door we came in, please." A reporter then
asked, "Mr. President, are you aware of the reports of the plane crash in New
York? Is there anything...", But Bush interrupted, and no doubt recalling his order,
"DON'T SAY ANYTHING YET," Bush responded, "I'll talk about it later." But still the
president did not leave. "He stepped forward and shook hands with [classroom
teacher] Daniels, slipping his left hand behind her in another photo-op pose. He
was taking his good old time. ... Bush lingered until the press was gone."
[Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism - From Inside the Bush White House, by Bill
Sammon, 10/02, p. 90]
Think about that: rather than rush out of the room at the first chance, Bush
actually stayed until after all the dozens of reporters had left! Having just been
told of a Pearl Harbor-type attack on US soil, Bush was indeed "openly stretching
out the moment." But he still wasn't done. Bush then turned to principal
Tose-Rigell, who was waiting to take him to the library for his speech on
education. He explained to her about the terror attacks and why he had to leave.
[Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism - From Inside the Bush White House, by Bill
Sammon, 10/02, p. 90] Finally, he went to an empty classroom next door where
his staff was based. [ABC News, 9/11/02] Given that Bush's program was
supposed to end at 9:20, he left the classroom only a couple of minutes earlier
than planned, if even that. [Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 9/16/01]
Why Stay?
The reason given why Bush didn't leave as soon as Card told him the news is:
"Without all the facts at hand, George Bush had no intention of upsetting the
schoolchildren who had come to read for him." [MSNBC, 10/29/02] Advisor Karl
Rove said, "The President thought for a second or two about getting up and
walking out of the room. But the drill was coming to a close and he didn't want to
alarm the children." [ABC, 9/11/02] This excuse is patently absurd, given the
security risks and importance of Bush being informed and making decisions as
Commander in Chief. Nor was the drill coming to a close: one drill had ended and
another was about to begin - it was a perfect time to simply say, "Excuse me"
and leave the room. Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport is only 3? miles
away; in fact, Booker was chosen as the location for the photo-op partly because
of its proximity to the airport. [Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 9/12/02] Hijackers could
have crashed a plane into Bush's publicized location and his security would have
been completely helpless to stop it. Remember, Bush's schedule had been
announced on September 7 and two of the 9/11 hijackers came to Sarasota that
same day. [White House, 9/7/01, Longboat Observer, 11/21/01, Washington
Post, 1/27/02] Furthermore, the Secret Service was aware of the strange
request for an interview a few hours earlier and the previous night's report of a
person in town who had made violent threats against Bush.
Indeed, a few days after 9/11, Sarasota's main newspaper reported, "Sarasota
barely skirted its own disaster. As it turns out, terrorists targeted the president
and Air Force One on Tuesday, maybe even while they were on the ground in
Sarasota and certainly not long after. The Secret Service learned of the threat
just minutes after Bush left Booker Elementary." [Sarasota Herald-Tribune,
9/16/01]
Bush Lingers On
Once he was out of the classroom, did Bush
immediately leave Booker? No. He stayed in
the adjacent room with his staff, calling Vice
President Cheney and National Security
Advisor Rice, and preparing a speech.
[Telegraph, 12/16/01, St. Petersburg Times
9/8/02] Incredibly, even as uncertain
information began to surface, suggesting that
more planes had been hijacked (eventually 11
planes would be suspected) [CBS, 9/11/02],
Bush was allowed to make his remarks at 9:30
- exactly the time and place stated on his
advance schedule. [Federal News Service,
9/10/01, see the transcript of his speech here] Why hasn't Bush's security staff
been criticized for their completely inexplicable decision to stay at the school?
And why didn't Bush's concern for the children extend to not making them and
the rest of the 200 or so people at the school terrorist targets?
At 9:16, NORAD was notified
that Flight 93 had been
hijacked, and at 9:24 it was
notified that Flight 77 had
also been hijacked and was
heading toward Washington
(though, as discussed
above, the hijacking was
known long before this).
[NORAD, 9/18/01] No media
report has suggested that
the possible shooting down
of hijacked airplanes was discussed at this time, however. It appears the
discussion was not broached until after 9:55. [Washington Post, 1/27/02, CBS,
9/11/02] At about 9:26, it was either FAA head Jane Garvey or FAA
administrator Ben Sliney (and not Bush) who decided to halt all airplane takeoffs
in the US. [Time, 9/14/01, USA Today, 8/13/02] Additionally, no evidence has
appeared suggesting Bush had a role in ordering any fighters into the skies.
Finally, to the Airport
By 9:35, Bush's motorcade
was ready to take him to the
Sarasota airport where Air
Force One was waiting.
[Telegraph, 12/16/01] At
9:37, Flight 77 crashed into
the Pentagon. Bush was
informed as his motorcade got
near the airport. (Apparently
Bush could be reached by
phone in his limousine at this
time.) [Washington Times,
10/8/02, Telegraph,
12/16/01] The motorcade
arrived around 9:43 and
pulled up close to Air Force
One. Security conducted an
extra-thorough search of all
the baggage for the other passengers, delaying takeoff until 9:55. [St.
Petersburg Times, 9/8/02 (B)]
A year later, Chief of Staff Andrew Card recalled that, "As we were heading to Air
Force One... [we] learned, what turned out to be a mistake, but we learned that
the Air Force One package could in fact be a target." [MSNBC, 9/9/02] This
echoes the report mentioned above that "terrorists targeted the president and
Air Force One... maybe even while they were on the ground in Sarasota ..."
[Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 9/16/01] This only increases the strangeness that
Bush wasn't immediately evacuated at 9:03 as some of his security had
recommended.
Bush spoke by telephone to Cheney as
the motorcade raced to the airport. [St.
Petersburg Times 9/8/02] Supposedly,
during this call Bush issued an order to
ground all flights within the country.
[Sarasota Magazine, 11/01] The FAA did
shut down the nationwide air traffic
system at around 9:45. [MSNBC, 9/22/01,
CNN, 9/12/01, New York Times, 9/12/01,
Newsday, 9/10/02, Washington Post,
9/12/01] But other reports state that it
was FAA administrator Ben Sliney who
made the decision without consulting
anyone. [USA Today, 8/13/02, USA Today,
8/13/02 (B)] For some time it was claimed that Transportation Secretary Norman
Mineta had made the decision, but it was later revealed that Mineta didn't even
know of the order until 15 minutes later. Apparently, "FAA officials had begged
[the reporter] to maintain the fiction." [Slate, 4/2/02] The idea that Bush made
the decision is even less plausible. In fact, there is no evidence at all to suggest
that Bush had by this point made even one decision relevant to his security or
that of the country.
Air Force One Takes Off Without Fighter Escort
Air Force One took off at either 9:55 or 9:57 a.m.
[CNN, 9/12/01, New York Times, 9/12/01, Telegraph,
12/16/01, CBS, 9/11/02, Washington Post, 9/12/01,
Washington Post, 1/27/02, AP, 9/12/01]
Communications Director Dan Bartlett remembered, "It
was like a rocket. For a good ten minutes, the plane
was going almost straight up." [CBS, 9/11/02]
But, incredibly, Air Force One took off without any
military fighter protection. This defies all explanation.
Recall that at 9:03 a.m., one of Bush's security people
said, "We're out of here. Can you get everyone
ready?" [Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 9/10/02] Certainly,
long before Bush left the elementary school at 9:35
a.m., arrangements would have been made to get
fighters to Sarasota as soon as possible. Not only
would it have been advisable to protect Air Force
One, but it would have been only sensible as another
way to protect Bush on the ground from terrorist
attack even before he left the school. In Florida, there
were two bases said to have fighters on 24-hour
alert, capable of getting airborne in approximately five
minutes. Homestead Air Station, 185 miles from Sarasota, and Tyndall Air Station,
235 miles from Sarasota; both had the highest readiness status on 9/11.
Presumably, as happened at other bases across the country, just after 9:03,
base commanders throughout Florida would have immediately begun preparations
to get their fighters ready. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]
Fighters left bases on the same alert status and traveled similar distances to
reach Washington, DC, well before 10:00, so why were the fighters delayed in
Florida? [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02]
Military planes should have been over Sarasota by the time Bush left Booker at
9:35 a.m. Yet, as will be described below, more than one hour after Air Force
One took off, there were still no fighters protecting it!
An administration official claimed, "The object
seemed to be simply to get the President
airborne and out of the way." [Telegraph,
12/16/01] But without fighter cover this makes
little sense, because the sky was arguably more
dangerous than the ground. At the time, there
were still over 3,000 planes in the air over the US
[USA Today, 8/13/02 (B)], including about half of
the planes in the region of Florida where Bush
was. [St. Petersburg Times, 9/7/02] Recall, too,
that the Secret Service learned of a threat to
Bush and Air Force One "just minutes after Bush left Booker Elementary." Karl
Rove, also on Air Force One, confirmed that a dangerous threat was known
before the plane took off: "They also made it clear they wanted to get us up
quickly, and they wanted to get us to a high altitude, because there had been a
specific threat made to Air Force One.... A declaration that Air Force One was a
target, and said in a way that they called it credible." [New Yorker, 10/1/01]
Shoot Down Authorized - Too
Late
Once he was airborne, Bush talked
to Cheney again and Cheney
recommended that Bush "order our
aircraft to shoot down these
airliners that have been hijacked."
[CBS, 9/11/02] "I said, 'You bet,'"
Bush later recalled. 'We had a little
discussion, but not much.'"
[Newsday, 9/23/01, USA Today,
9/16/01, Washington Post,
1/27/02] However, even though
only Bush had the authority to
order a passenger plane shot
down [CNN, 10/26/99], the order was apparently given before Bush discussed it
with Cheney. One flight commander recalled, "After the Pentagon was hit, we
were told there were more [airliners] coming. Not 'might be'; they were coming."
A call from someone in the White House declared the Washington area "a free-fire
zone," meaning, according to one of the responding fighter pilots, "we were given
authority to use force, if the situation required it." [Aviation Week and Space
Technology, 9/9/02]
Extraordinary times can demand extraordinary measures, so having someone
other than Bush give this order could be understandable. But Bush was available
and talking to people like Cheney after 9:30 a.m. Around this time, officials feared
that as many as 11 airliners had been hijacked [CBS, 9/11/02], so why weren't
Bush and Cheney even considering this course of action until about 10:00 a.m.?
Was Bush being kept out of the loop in reality, or only in the media reports?
Is the lateness of this discussion merely political spin to reduce speculation that
Flight 93 had been shot down? Flight 93 was still in the air after the Bush
authorization, and fighters were given orders to shoot it down if necessary. [ABC
News, 9/11/02] NORAD knew at 9:16 a.m. that Flight 93 was hijacked [NORAD,
9/18/01], but supposedly fighters weren't scrambled until minutes before it
crashed at 10:06 a.m.
Going Nowhere as Threats Increase
Shortly after takeoff, Cheney apparently informed Bush of "a credible threat" to
Air Force One. [AP, 9/13/01 (D)] US Representative Adam Putnam "had barely
settled into his seat on Air Force One ... when he got the news that terrorists
apparently had set their sights on the plane." [Orlando Sentinel, 9/14/01] The
Secret Service had received an anonymous call: "Air Force One is next." The
caller allegedly knew the agency's code words relating to Air Force One
procedures. Pilot Colonel Mark Tillman was told of the threat and he asked that
an armed guard be stationed at the cockpit door. The Associated Press
reported that the threat came "within the same hour" as the Pentagon crash
(i.e., before 10:00 a.m., roughly when the plane took off). [AP, 9/13/01 (D)]
Details suggest this threat was not the same as the earlier one, but it's hard to
know for sure.
In his comments at Booker, Bush said he was immediately flying back to
Washington, but soon after takeoff, he, Cheney and the Secret Service began
arguing whether it was safe to fly back to the capital. [Telegraph, 12/16/01]
Andrew Card told Bush, "We've got to let the dust settle before we go back."
[St. Petersburg Times, 9/8/02] The plane apparently stayed over Sarasota until
the argument was settled. Accounts differ, but until about 10:35 a.m. [CBS,
9/11/02 (B), Washington Post, 1/27/02], Air Force One "appeared to be going
nowhere. The journalists on board all of whom were barred from communicating
with their offices sensed that the plane was flying in big, slow circles."
[Telegraph, 12/16/01]
Cheney apparently called Bush again at 10:32 a.m., and told him of another threat
to Air Force One. Within minutes, the argument was over, and the plane turned
away from Washington and flew to Louisiana instead. [Washington Post, 1/27/02]
Bush recalled: "I wanted to come back to Washington, but the circumstances
were such that it was just impossible for the Secret Service or the national
security team to clear the way for Air Force One to come back." [CBS, 9/11/02]
Given that the rocket-like takeoff was due to a threat, this must have been
another threat, possibly even a third threat.
Around 10:55 a.m., there was yet another threat
to Air Force One. The pilot, Colonel Mark Tillman,
said he was warned that a suspect airliner was
dead ahead. "Coming out of Sarasota there was
one call that said there was an airliner off our
nose that they did not have contact with." Tillman
took evasive action, pulling his plane even higher
above normal traffic. [CBS, 9/11/02 (B)]
Reporters on board noticed the rise in elevation.
[Dallas Morning News, 8/28/02, Salon, 9/12/01]
The report was apparently a false alarm, but it
shows the folly of having Bush fly without a
fighter escort.
Were There Threats to Air Force One?
The threat or threats to Air Force One were announced on September 12, after
mounting criticism that Bush was out of sight in Louisiana and Nebraska during
most of the day and did not return to Washington until 10 hours after the
attacks. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said there was "real and credible
information that the White House and Air Force One were targets." [White House,
9/12/01] On September 13, New York Times columnist William Safire wrote - and
Bush's political strategist Karl Rove confirmed - that there was an "inside" threat
that "may have broken the secret codes [showing a knowledge of presidential
procedures]." [New York Times, 9/13/01] Had terrorists hacked their way into
sensitive White House computers? Was there a mole in the White House?
No. It turned out the entire story was made up. [Washington Post, 9/27/01] The
press expressed considerable skepticism about the story. For instance, one
Florida newspaper thought Fleischer's disclosure was "an apparent effort to
explain why the president was flown to Air Force bases" before returning to
Washington. [St. Petersburg Times, 9/13/01] When asked on September 15
about the "credible evidence," Fleischer said, "we exhausted that topic about two
days ago." [White House, 9/15/01] On September 26, CBS News reported:
"Finally, there is this postscript to the puzzle of how someone presumed to be a
terrorist was able to call in a threat against Air Force One using a secret code
name for the president's plane. Well, as it turns out, that simply never happened.
Sources say White House staffers apparently misunderstood comments made by
their security detail." [CBS, 9/26/01] One former official who served in George
Bush Sr.'s administration told Human Events Online, which bills itself as "the
national conservative weekly," that he was "deeply disappointed by [Bush's]
zigzagging across the country." [Human Events Online, 9/17/01] At the end of
the month, Slate magazine awarded its "Whopper of the Week" to Karl Rove, Ari
Fleischer, and Dick Cheney. [Slate, 9/28/01]
No one knew exactly where the bogus story originated from, but "what can be
safely said is that it served the White House's immediate purposes, even though
it was completely untrue." [Telegraph, 12/16/01] What were those purposes? A
well-informed, anonymous Washington official said, "It did two things for [Cheney].
It reinforced his argument that the President should stay out of town, and it gave
George W. an excellent reason for doing so." [Telegraph, 12/16/01] When Bush
was asked in May 2002 why he had flown to two Air Force bases before
returning to Washington, Bush said, "I was trying to get out of harm's way."
[White House, 5/21/02]
The most obviously bogus threat - the mole knowing secret codes - came from
Cheney in a pivotal moment in his argument with Bush over where Bush should go.
But were the other threats, for instance, the one made before Air Force One
even took off, or the airline suspected of crashing into Air Force One, also
bogus?
When Does the Fighter Escort Finally
Arrive?
Much like the time when Bush left the Booker
classroom, the time when fighters finally reached
Air Force One is rarely mentioned, and when it is,
the facts are highly debatable. According to one
account, around 10:00 a.m. Air Force One was
"joined by an escort of F-16 fighters from a base
near Jacksonville, Florida." [Telegraph, 12/16/01]
But one month later, it was reported that in
Cheney's 10:32 phone call, he told Bush that it
would take another 40 to 90 minutes [as late as
noon] to get protective fighters up to escort Air
Force One. [Washington Post, 1/27/02] Another
account said, "Air Force One headed toward
Jacksonville [at 10:41] to meet jets scrambled to
give the presidential jet its own air cover," but it
isn't said when the plane actually met up with the
fighters. [New York Times, 9/16/01 (B)] We know
that when Air Force One took evasive action
around 10:55, there was no fighter escort. NORAD commander Major General
Larry Arnold later said, "We scrambled available airplanes from Tyndall [note this
is near Tallahassee, not Jacksonville, Florida] and then from Ellington in Houston,
Texas," but he doesn't say when. [Code One Magazine, 1/02] In another account,
the first two F-16s to arrive are piloted by Shane Brotherton and Randy Roberts,
from the Texas Air National Guard, not from any Florida base. [CBS, 9/11/02] All
that's known for sure is that by 11:30 there were six fighters protecting Air
Force One. [Sarasota Magazine, 9/19/01]
It would appear that fighters arrived some
time between 11:00 and 11:30. These
fighters were supposed to be on 24-hour
alert, ready to get into the air in about five
minutes. If we assume the fighters flew at a
speed of 1,100 mph, the same speed Major
Gen. Arnold said fighters used to reach New
York City earlier in the day when traveling a
comparable distance [MSNBC, 9/23/01 (C),
Slate, 1/16/02], the fighters should have
reached Sarasota in about 10 minutes. Yet
they took around two hours to reach Air
Force One from when they were likely first
needed, shortly after 9:00.
This clearly goes beyond mere
incompetence, yet no newspaper article has
ever raised the issue. Was Cheney able to prevent the fighters from reaching Air
Force One, perhaps to convince Bush not to return to Washington? If so, why?
Did Cheney assume (or know) that Bush was in no real danger? Like so many
other questions surrounding 9/11, we do not know.
Barksdale Air Force Base
Air Force One landed at Barksdale Air Force base
near Shreveport, Louisiana at about 11:45 a.m.
[CBS, 9/11/02, Telegraph, 12/16/01, Sarasota
Magazine, 11/01] "The official reason for landing at
Barksdale was that Bush felt it necessary to make
a further statement, but it isn't unreasonable to
assume that as there was no agreement as to
what the President's movements should be it was
felt he might as well be on the ground as in the
air." [Telegraph, 12/16/01, CBS, 9/11/02]
Ironically, the landing came only a short time after Bush's plane was finally
protected by fighters.
There was quite a difference in the protection afforded Bush at Barksdale and
what was in Sarasota. Bush was left unprotected at a known location in Sarasota
for nearly 30 minutes. At Barksdale, a location that was at the time unknown,
Congressman Dan Miller "was amazed at the armored equipment and soldiers with
automatic weapons that immediately surrounded the plane." [Sarasota Magazine,
11/01] Bush was driven to base headquarters in a Humvee escorted by armed
outriders. Reporters and others remained under strict orders not to give out
their location. [Telegraph, 12/16/01]
Bush was taken to a secret and secure
place on the base. [Louisiana Life, Autumn
2002] Shortly after 12:30 p.m., Bush
taped a short speech, which he wrote on
a napkin. [Louisiana Life, Autumn 2002,
Salon, 9/12/01, Washington Times,
10/8/02] The tape was broadcast on
television at around 1:20 p.m. [Salon
9/11/01] He also "spent the next hour
and a half talking on the phone," again
arguing with Cheney and others over
where he should go next. [Sarasota
Magazine, 11/01] The Secret Service felt
the situation in Washington was still unsafe. [CBS, 9/11/02] Bush told Karl Rove: "I
want to go back home as soon as possible." Rove answered: "Our people are
saying it's unstable still." [AP, 9/13/01 (D)] Bush was told he could get to the US
Strategic Command center in Offutt, Nebraska, quicker than he could fly to
Washington, so he agreed to go to Nebraska. [Telegraph, 12/16/01, AP,
9/13/01 (D)]
Just after 1:00 p.m., Bush supposedly "received an intelligence report from the
base commander that a high-speed object was headed for his ranch in Crawford,
Texas." It turned out to be another false alarm. [Fighting Back: The War on
Terrorism - From Inside the Bush White House, by Bill Sammon, 10/02, p.117]
This may well be another bogus report designed to explain why Bush didn't
return to Washington at this time, since US airspace was declared clear except
for some military and emergency flights at 12:16 p.m. [USA Today, 8/12/02 (C)]
By 12:30, the FAA reported that only about 50 of these flights were still flying in
US airspace, and none were reporting problems [CNN, 9/12/01, New York Times,
9/12/01], so how could an unknown plane have been headed toward Bush's
ranch 30 minutes after that?
Offutt Air Force Base
Air Force One left Barksdale for Offutt Air Force Base around 1:30 p.m. [CBS,
9/11/02, Telegraph, 12/16/01, Salon, 9/11/01, Washington Post, 9/11/01,
MSNBC, 9/22/01, CNN, 9/12/01] The Air Force One entourage was pared down
to a few essential staffers such as Ari Fleischer, Andrew Card, Karl Rove, Dan
Bartlett, and Gordon Johndroe [White House, 9/11/01], plus about five
reporters. [AP, 9/12/01 (D)] During the flight, Bush remained in "continuous
contact" with the White House Situation Room and Vice President Cheney. [CNN,
9/11/01 (B)]
Air Force One landed at Offutt shortly before 3:00 p.m. [Washington Post,
9/11/01] At 3:06, Bush passed through security to the US Strategic Command
Underground Command Center [Salon, 9/11/01, CBS, 9/11/02] and was taken
into an underground bunker designed to withstand a nuclear blast. [Telegraph,
12/16/01]
There, he held a teleconference call
with Vice President Cheney, National
Security Advisor Rice, Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage, CIA Director
Tenet, Transportation Secretary
Norman Mineta, and others. [ABC
News, 9/11/02, Telegraph, 12/16/01,
Washington Times, 10/8/02] The
meeting lasted about an hour.
[Telegraph, 12/16/01, Salon, 9/11/01,
AP, 8/19/02] Rice recalled that during
the meeting, Tenet told Bush, "Sir, I
believe it's al-Qaeda. We're doing the
assessment but it looks like, it feels like, it smells like al-Qaeda." [CBS, 9/11/02]
By this time, people were anticipating and expecting another reassuring public
statement from Bush. [Orlando Sentinel, 9/12/01] The White House staff was
preparing for Bush to address the nation from the Offutt bunker, but Bush
decided instead to return to Washington. [CBS, 9/11/02]
As a side note, Warren Buffett, one of the richest people in the world, was
hosting an unpublicized charity benefit inside the high security Offutt military base
at 8:00 a.m. With him were business leaders and several executives from the
World Trade Center, including Anne Tatlock of Fiduciary Trust Co. International,
who likely would have died had it not been for the meeting. [San Francisco
Business Times, 2/1/02] They watched a lot of the television coverage that
morning, but it's unknown if any of these people were still at Offutt by the time
Bush arrived in the afternoon.
Back in Washington
Air Force One left Offutt around 4:30 p.m. [MSNBC,
9/22/01, CNN, 9/12/01, Telegraph, 12/16/01] and
landed at Andrews Air Force Base at 6:34 p.m.,
escorted by two F-15 fighters and one F-16. [CNN,
9/11/01] Bush then took the Marine One helicopter to
the White House [Salon 9/11/01], arriving shortly
before 7:00 p.m. [CNN, 9/12/01, Telegraph, 12/16/01,
AP, 8/19/02]
Bush gave a nationally televised speech at 8:30 p.m.
[CNN, 9/12/01, White House, 9/11/01], speaking for
about five minutes. [US News, 9/14/01] In what would
later be called the Bush Doctrine, he stated, "We will
make no distinction between the terrorists who
committed these acts and those who harbor them." [Washington Post, 1/27/02]
Around 9:00 p.m., Bush met with his full National
Security Council, followed roughly half an hour
later by a meeting with a smaller group of key
advisors. Bush and his advisors had already
decided bin Laden was behind the attacks. CIA
Director Tenet told Bush that al-Qaeda and the
Taliban in Afghanistan were essentially one and
the same. [Washington Post, 1/27/02]
Before going to sleep around 11:30 p.m., Bush
wrote in his diary, "The Pearl Harbor of the 21st
century took place today.... We think it's Osama
bin Laden." [Washington Post, 1/27/02]
Rewriting History
The many accounts of what happened to Bush on 9/11 are riddled with
disinformation of false threats, omitted details, fudged timing, and more. But
around September 11, 2002, the heavily publicized first anniversary of the
attacks, there was an obvious attempt to further rewrite the story.
Chief of Staff Andrew Card claimed that after he told Bush about the second
World Trade Center crash, "it was only a matter of seconds" before Bush
"excused himself very politely to the teacher and to the students, and he left"
the classroom. Card also stated that Bush "quickly excused himself to a holding
room." [San Francisco Chronicle, 9/11/02] In a different account, Card said, "Not
that many seconds later the president excused himself from the classroom."
[MSNBC, 9/9/02] The Booker school video shows these statements are lies -
unless "a matter of seconds" means over 700 seconds!
Sandra Kay Daniels, the teacher whose second-grade classroom Bush visited on
9/11, told the Los Angeles Times that after Card informed Bush of the second
crash, Bush got up and left. "He said, 'Ms. Daniels, I have to leave now.' ... Looking
at his face, you knew something was wrong. I said a little prayer for him. He
shook my hand and left." Daniels also said, "I knew something was up when
President Bush didn't pick up the book and participate in the lesson." [Los
Angeles Times, 9/11/02] However, the Booker video clearly shows that Bush
did follow along after being told of the second plane. [Video: Center for
Cooperative Research, Buzzflash, Global Free Press, The Emperor's New Clothes,
or Liberty DYNU]
The New York Post reported, "A federal agent rushed into the room to inform the
president of the United States. President Bush had been presiding over
[Daniels's] reading class last 9/11, when a Secret Service agent interrupted the
lesson and asked, 'Where can we get to a television?'" Daniels then claimed that
Bush left the class even before the second crash: "The president bolted right
out of here and told me: 'Take over.'" When the second crash occurred, she
claims her students were watching TV in a nearby media room. [New York Post,
9/12/02] This article is riddled with errors. As mentioned previously, the Secret
Service was already watching the second plane crash live on television in an
adjacent room at 9:03 - long before this supposedly happened. Nor did Bush
"bolt" out of the room; in fact, even pro-Bush author Bill Sammon called Bush "the
dawdler in chief" for taking so long to leave the room. [Fighting Back: The War
on Terrorism - From Inside the Bush White House, by Bill Sammon, 10/02, p. 90]
Bush himself took part in the historical
revisionism. In an extensive video
interview shown on CBS's "60 Minutes," he
again repeated his bizarre belief that he
was watching television when the first
crash took place. CBS also revived the
false story that terrorists had broken Air
Force One's secret codes, even though it
was CBS who debunked that same story
nearly a year earlier. [CBS, 9/11/02]
Vital Questions Remain Unanswered
Needless to say, in the anniversary
hoopla, Bush and other leaders were
described as "resolute," "brave," "strong,"
and so forth. Even the minor level of media criticism just after 9/11 that led to
several reporters losing their jobs was absent. The topic of Bush's behavior on
9/11 has been barely mentioned in the media since.
There are many questions that deserve answers. So many pieces of the puzzle
do not fit. Simply by reading the mainstream media reports, we can see that mere
incompetence doesn't explain what happened to Bush on that day. For instance,
it makes no sense that Bush would listen to a story about a goat long after being
told the US was under attack, and even after the Secret Service decided to
immediately evacuate him from the school. It defies explanation that Air Force
One's fighter escort took two hours to appear. And it is mind-boggling that there
are seven different versions of how Bush learned about the first crash.
It's doubtful that the Independent Commission investigation will look critically at
what Bush did on 9/11 and why he did it. Despite the contradictory reports, no
one in the mainstream media has yet demanded clarification of the many obvious
inconsistencies and problems of the official version. Anyone even asking
questions has been quickly insulted as anti-American, accused of bashing the
president in a time of war, or branded a conspiracy nut. Only a few relatives of
the 9/11 attacks have been able to raise these issues publicly. For instance,
Kristen Breitweiser told Phil Donahue: "It was clear that we were under attack.
Why didn't the Secret Service whisk [Bush] out of that school? ... [H]e is the
commander-in-chief of the United States of America, our country was clearly
under attack, it was after the second building was hit. I want to know why he sat
there for 25 minutes." [Donahue, 8/13/02] But so far, few have listened to their
concerns.
Because the media has failed in its role to ask these questions, much less
attempt to answer them, it is now the responsibility of ordinary Americans - of
you, of me, and the people we know - to gather the information, look for
answers, and sound the alarm.
