The accepted intelligence at the time was that Saddam's WMD capability was less than that of Iran et al; that the regime was "living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them."; that the " first line of defense... should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration." (as per Condoleeza Rice); that the containment policy was a "success"; that we had "kept him contained, kept him in his box"; that Iraq was "unable to project conventional power against his neighbors" and that "he threatens not the United States" (as per Colin Powell). Further to this, it was widely perceived that the containment policies had "worked. He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction"; that Saddam was "unable to project conventional power against his neighbors", meaning that "in effect, our [containment] policies have strengthened the security of the neighbors of Iraq."
Dick Cheney also asserted the following:
"MR. RUSSERT: Do we have any evidence linking Saddam Hussein or Iraqis to this operation [9/11]?
VICE PRES. CHENEY: No."
Further to this, a published document from the British Government read that "Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran." The MOD has since taken action against those who leaked the document and have passed no comment as to whether the document is false or not.
It must also be noted that UN inspectors found no evidence of WMDs anywhere in the country and further found evidence of WMD destruction in various installations that implied that WMDs had been destroyed long ago.
One last thing: here in Britain a claim was made that Saddam not only had "stockpiles" of WMDs but that they were ready for launch within a 45 minute window. The "sexed up" or "dodgy" dossier has since been rejected as a hopeless exaggeration of unreliable evidence contrary to the majority evidence.
Tony Blair has since apologised for the shortfallings of the war and in particular the handling of evidence prior to the invasion.
The main source of friction was that all evidence used by the Governments of the UK and the USA was known to be "thin" and was touted as undeniable.
Rich::