In over 200 cases a NOrth Carolina with held evidence
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/01/27/siu.rogue.justice.taylor/index.html
I know Taylor wasn't the most sensible person but really
For 17 years, Taylor tried to overturn his conviction, going all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. He requested DNA testing, which was denied. Then, in 2007, attorney Chris Mumma from the North Carolina Center on Actual Innocence took his case, and referred it to the newly formed North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission.
Long wait for justice
The commission -- made up of law enforcement officials, attorneys and victims' advocates -- is the only one of its kind in the country and is empowered to investigate cases where there is evidence of wrongful convictions.
"They had subpoena power; they could get access to all the prosecution's records, all the police records, everything that the defense never had access to. ... They could order DNA testing that Greg was denied previously," Mumma said, "And that commission voted unanimously that there was sufficient evidence of innocence in Greg's case that it did merit judicial review."
The evidence they reviewed included an unreliable witness, an inaccurate jailhouse snitch and an improperly trained forensics dog. But there was one more revelation to come.
What the three-judge panel learned shook the North Carolina justice system. In dramatic testimony, a lab analyst revealed that the jury in Taylor's 1993 trial never heard about a second blood test done by the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) crime lab. That second, more definitive test failed to confirm that the substance found on his truck was blood.
The results of that test, which could have altered the verdict, were buried in the case files for 17 years. That new evidence, along with a host of other problems at his first trial, led the panel to declare Greg was innocent.
As shocking as the buried evidence was a statement made by the SBI analyst, Duane Deaver, on the stand. When asked why he didn't report the key test, Deaver said he was just complying with the lab's accepted practices of the time. (Since then, Deaver has been fired by the SBI, his lawyer says.)
An audit commissioned by the North Carolina attorney general in August 2010 found more than 200 cases similar to Taylor's from 1986 until 2003 in which lab results for blood tests were withheld.
"There were over 230 cases where reports were not complete. Or reports didn't actually correspond to the laboratory notes, or information was not presented in the report that was in the laboratory notes as to the results of the test," said Chris Swecker, a former FBI assistant director who was hired to do the audit, "What we saw was ... just not right."
Here are some bits of the report
Out of 15,419 lab files screened and examined this review identified 230 Laboratory
cases in which laboratory reports similar to the Taylor cases were present. In 40 of
these cases no suspect was charged. Out of a total of 269 individuals ultimately
charged in the remaining 190 cases, 80 are still serving sentences (four are on death
row), three were executed and five died in prison. In phase two of this review the 230
cases identified in phase one were reviewed in detail and divided into four categories.
These cases have in common that that they contain lab reports that mention positive
presumptive test results but omit the results other more sensitive tests. These include:
1. Cases that mention that the presence of blood is not conclusive but fail to report
that a confirmatory test was conducted and with negative results;
2. Cases with lab files that contain reports that fail to mention of one or more
negative or inconclusive confirmatory test(s) and are thus incomplete;
3. Cases that contain misleading reports that stated that no further tests were
conducted when, in fact, one or more confirmatory tests were conducted with
negative or inconclusive results;
4. Cases in which the Laboratory test results were overstated or lab notes
contradict the reported result.
A limited review of the SBI Laboratory DNA program did not identify any systemic
problems however several cases were reviewed that involved serious errors on the part
of DNA Analysts and several recommendations were made to address public
confidence in this important program.
This report raises serious issues about laboratory reporting practices from 1987-2003
and the potential that information that was material and even favorable to the defense of
criminal charges filed was withheld or misrepresented. The factors that contributed to
these issues range from poorly crafted policy; lack of objectivity, the absence of clear
report writing guidance; inattention to reporting methods that left too much discretion to
the individual Analyst: lack of transparency; and ineffective management and oversight
of the Forensic Biology Section from 1987 through 2003. A series of Findings and
Recommendations were made to address these issues including an immediate
notification to the appropriate District Attorney to review the listed cases and notify any
convicted defendants who may have been adversely impacted; a legal review of the
Lab’s reporting methods; enhanced training; more transparency in the Lab’s policies
5
and procedures and the designation of an Ombudsman position to review and quickly
act on information regarding potential laboratory issues and errors.
Taylor’s Attorney, Joe Chesire, argued at the Three-Judge Panel hearing that SBI
Analyst Deaver’s failure to report the negative results of confirmatory tests he
conducted for the presence of blood on Taylor’s vehicle was not only new evidence of
Taylor’s innocence, but the reports themselves were “incorrect, false and misleading”
and possibly even “criminal obstruction of justice”. SA Deaver, who had not served in
the Lab since 1993, testified before the Three-Judge Panel in 2009 that the practice of
not reporting negative confirmatory blood test results which followed positive
presumptive tests in the final lab report was “policy” of the SBI at the time of the 1993
trial, and that the language used in his lab report was standard verbiage prescribed by
the SBI and the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/ Laboratory
Accreditation Board. (ASCLD/LAB). 7
6
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/01/27/siu.rogue.justice.taylor/index.html
I know Taylor wasn't the most sensible person but really
For 17 years, Taylor tried to overturn his conviction, going all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. He requested DNA testing, which was denied. Then, in 2007, attorney Chris Mumma from the North Carolina Center on Actual Innocence took his case, and referred it to the newly formed North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission.
Long wait for justice
The commission -- made up of law enforcement officials, attorneys and victims' advocates -- is the only one of its kind in the country and is empowered to investigate cases where there is evidence of wrongful convictions.
"They had subpoena power; they could get access to all the prosecution's records, all the police records, everything that the defense never had access to. ... They could order DNA testing that Greg was denied previously," Mumma said, "And that commission voted unanimously that there was sufficient evidence of innocence in Greg's case that it did merit judicial review."
The evidence they reviewed included an unreliable witness, an inaccurate jailhouse snitch and an improperly trained forensics dog. But there was one more revelation to come.
What the three-judge panel learned shook the North Carolina justice system. In dramatic testimony, a lab analyst revealed that the jury in Taylor's 1993 trial never heard about a second blood test done by the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) crime lab. That second, more definitive test failed to confirm that the substance found on his truck was blood.
The results of that test, which could have altered the verdict, were buried in the case files for 17 years. That new evidence, along with a host of other problems at his first trial, led the panel to declare Greg was innocent.
As shocking as the buried evidence was a statement made by the SBI analyst, Duane Deaver, on the stand. When asked why he didn't report the key test, Deaver said he was just complying with the lab's accepted practices of the time. (Since then, Deaver has been fired by the SBI, his lawyer says.)
An audit commissioned by the North Carolina attorney general in August 2010 found more than 200 cases similar to Taylor's from 1986 until 2003 in which lab results for blood tests were withheld.
"There were over 230 cases where reports were not complete. Or reports didn't actually correspond to the laboratory notes, or information was not presented in the report that was in the laboratory notes as to the results of the test," said Chris Swecker, a former FBI assistant director who was hired to do the audit, "What we saw was ... just not right."
Here are some bits of the report
Out of 15,419 lab files screened and examined this review identified 230 Laboratory
cases in which laboratory reports similar to the Taylor cases were present. In 40 of
these cases no suspect was charged. Out of a total of 269 individuals ultimately
charged in the remaining 190 cases, 80 are still serving sentences (four are on death
row), three were executed and five died in prison. In phase two of this review the 230
cases identified in phase one were reviewed in detail and divided into four categories.
These cases have in common that that they contain lab reports that mention positive
presumptive test results but omit the results other more sensitive tests. These include:
1. Cases that mention that the presence of blood is not conclusive but fail to report
that a confirmatory test was conducted and with negative results;
2. Cases with lab files that contain reports that fail to mention of one or more
negative or inconclusive confirmatory test(s) and are thus incomplete;
3. Cases that contain misleading reports that stated that no further tests were
conducted when, in fact, one or more confirmatory tests were conducted with
negative or inconclusive results;
4. Cases in which the Laboratory test results were overstated or lab notes
contradict the reported result.
A limited review of the SBI Laboratory DNA program did not identify any systemic
problems however several cases were reviewed that involved serious errors on the part
of DNA Analysts and several recommendations were made to address public
confidence in this important program.
This report raises serious issues about laboratory reporting practices from 1987-2003
and the potential that information that was material and even favorable to the defense of
criminal charges filed was withheld or misrepresented. The factors that contributed to
these issues range from poorly crafted policy; lack of objectivity, the absence of clear
report writing guidance; inattention to reporting methods that left too much discretion to
the individual Analyst: lack of transparency; and ineffective management and oversight
of the Forensic Biology Section from 1987 through 2003. A series of Findings and
Recommendations were made to address these issues including an immediate
notification to the appropriate District Attorney to review the listed cases and notify any
convicted defendants who may have been adversely impacted; a legal review of the
Lab’s reporting methods; enhanced training; more transparency in the Lab’s policies
5
and procedures and the designation of an Ombudsman position to review and quickly
act on information regarding potential laboratory issues and errors.
Taylor’s Attorney, Joe Chesire, argued at the Three-Judge Panel hearing that SBI
Analyst Deaver’s failure to report the negative results of confirmatory tests he
conducted for the presence of blood on Taylor’s vehicle was not only new evidence of
Taylor’s innocence, but the reports themselves were “incorrect, false and misleading”
and possibly even “criminal obstruction of justice”. SA Deaver, who had not served in
the Lab since 1993, testified before the Three-Judge Panel in 2009 that the practice of
not reporting negative confirmatory blood test results which followed positive
presumptive tests in the final lab report was “policy” of the SBI at the time of the 1993
trial, and that the language used in his lab report was standard verbiage prescribed by
the SBI and the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/ Laboratory
Accreditation Board. (ASCLD/LAB). 7
6
