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The British have just released Lord Butler's inquiry on the intelligence used to justify the war against Iraq. Listed below are the main points.
_________________________________________
At-a-glance: Butler report
The reliability of intelligence
Doubt has been cast on a "high proportion" of human intelligence sources - and so on the quality of intelligence assessments given to ministers and officials
The problems were partly caused by weaknesses in the way MI6 carried out its checks on sources
There was third hand reporting of information about Iraqi chemical and biological weapons -with a sub-source reporting to a second MI6 main source
One MI6 source reported authoritatively on some issues but on others was "passing on what he had heard within his circle"
Reports from a third MI6 main source have been withdrawn as unreliable
Information from another country's intelligence agency on Iraqi production of biological and chemical agents "were seriously flawed" and the grounds for British assessments that Iraq had recently produced such stocks "no longer exist"
There was no "over-reliance" on dissent Iraqi sources
Iraqi weapons
It would be rash to say now that no evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programmes will ever be found
Before the war Iraq wanted to get banned weapons, including a nuclear programme
Iraq was developing ballistic missiles with a longer range than allowed
It did not have significant, if any, stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state fit for use, or developed plans for using them.
The war decision
There was "no recent intelligence" to lead people to conclude Iraq was of more immediate concern than other countries, although its history prompted the view there needed to be a threat of force to ensure Saddam Hussein's compliance
The inquiry is surprised ministers, officials, and intelligence agencies did not reassess the quality of intelligence as UN weapons inspectors failed to make finds in the months immediately before the war
Intelligence only played a "limited" role in determining the legality of the war
No evidence was found that Britain went to war to secure continued access to oil supplies
The 45-minute claim
The claim that Iraq could use weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes was should not have been made in the government's weapons dossier without explaining what the claim referred to
MI6 now says the intelligence report on the claim "has come into question", with doubts cast about one of the links in the reporting chain
Uranium from Niger
British intelligence on the claim that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger was "credible". There was not conclusive evidence Iraq actually purchased the material, nor did the government make that claim.
Mobile biological weapons laboratories
It was "reasonable" for intelligence chiefs to report about Iraq seeking more mobile biological weapons labs
But the intelligence from the source did not show Iraq had recently produced stocks of biological agents
This evidence could not have existed if MI6 had talked to the source directly from 2000 onwards.
The weapons dossier
"A serious weakness" was that the intelligence chiefs' warnings about the limitations of their judgements were not made clear enough
Judgements in the dossier "went to (although not beyond) the outer limits of the intelligence available"
The impression there was "firmer and fuller" intelligence backing up the dossier was reinforced when Tony Blair told MPs on its publication day the picture painted by intelligence agencies was "extensive, detailed and authoritative"
Joint Intelligence committee (JIC)
No evidence has been found of "deliberate distortion or of culpable negligence"
In general, original intelligence was reported correctly in JIC assessments, with the exception of the 45-minute claim
An intelligence report important in drafting the dossier should have been shown to key experts in the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), who were right to raise concerns
JIC chairman John Scarlett should not withdraw from taking up his new job as director of MI6
The workings of government
The inquiry team is concerned about the "informality" of government procedures reduced the "scope for informed collective political judgement" - a reference to cabinet decision making
Lord Butler's report in full
_________________________________________
At-a-glance: Butler report
The reliability of intelligence
Doubt has been cast on a "high proportion" of human intelligence sources - and so on the quality of intelligence assessments given to ministers and officials
The problems were partly caused by weaknesses in the way MI6 carried out its checks on sources
There was third hand reporting of information about Iraqi chemical and biological weapons -with a sub-source reporting to a second MI6 main source
One MI6 source reported authoritatively on some issues but on others was "passing on what he had heard within his circle"
Reports from a third MI6 main source have been withdrawn as unreliable
Information from another country's intelligence agency on Iraqi production of biological and chemical agents "were seriously flawed" and the grounds for British assessments that Iraq had recently produced such stocks "no longer exist"
There was no "over-reliance" on dissent Iraqi sources
Iraqi weapons
It would be rash to say now that no evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programmes will ever be found
Before the war Iraq wanted to get banned weapons, including a nuclear programme
Iraq was developing ballistic missiles with a longer range than allowed
It did not have significant, if any, stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state fit for use, or developed plans for using them.
The war decision
There was "no recent intelligence" to lead people to conclude Iraq was of more immediate concern than other countries, although its history prompted the view there needed to be a threat of force to ensure Saddam Hussein's compliance
The inquiry is surprised ministers, officials, and intelligence agencies did not reassess the quality of intelligence as UN weapons inspectors failed to make finds in the months immediately before the war
Intelligence only played a "limited" role in determining the legality of the war
No evidence was found that Britain went to war to secure continued access to oil supplies
The 45-minute claim
The claim that Iraq could use weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes was should not have been made in the government's weapons dossier without explaining what the claim referred to
MI6 now says the intelligence report on the claim "has come into question", with doubts cast about one of the links in the reporting chain
Uranium from Niger
British intelligence on the claim that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger was "credible". There was not conclusive evidence Iraq actually purchased the material, nor did the government make that claim.
Mobile biological weapons laboratories
It was "reasonable" for intelligence chiefs to report about Iraq seeking more mobile biological weapons labs
But the intelligence from the source did not show Iraq had recently produced stocks of biological agents
This evidence could not have existed if MI6 had talked to the source directly from 2000 onwards.
The weapons dossier
"A serious weakness" was that the intelligence chiefs' warnings about the limitations of their judgements were not made clear enough
Judgements in the dossier "went to (although not beyond) the outer limits of the intelligence available"
The impression there was "firmer and fuller" intelligence backing up the dossier was reinforced when Tony Blair told MPs on its publication day the picture painted by intelligence agencies was "extensive, detailed and authoritative"
Joint Intelligence committee (JIC)
No evidence has been found of "deliberate distortion or of culpable negligence"
In general, original intelligence was reported correctly in JIC assessments, with the exception of the 45-minute claim
An intelligence report important in drafting the dossier should have been shown to key experts in the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), who were right to raise concerns
JIC chairman John Scarlett should not withdraw from taking up his new job as director of MI6
The workings of government
The inquiry team is concerned about the "informality" of government procedures reduced the "scope for informed collective political judgement" - a reference to cabinet decision making
Lord Butler's report in full
