Actually, if you want a formal definition of lie, use St. Augustine's-a false signification with the intent to deceive. Bush acoccomplished both prongs numerous times. Perhaps the best example of his continual deceit is his Cincinnattu speech of Oct 7, 2002 (two months before the "slam dunk" assurance), which was palinly fabricated, but even if you accept it, doesn't rescue him on the timeline), located at
Link
The general statements
It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people.
Only the last was defensible. He was unequivocally not seeking nuclear weapons. the best David Kay would say is that they never lost their ambition. But there was absolutely no overt acts in furtherance, to borrow a concept from the law of criminal consipracy, after 1998 and Desert Fox. So saith David Kay. And so saith comon sense. By 2003, the man was barely in charge. He had scared scientists burying gyroscopes in the yard and saving 10 year old bio cultures in the refrigerator, but no true programs that had funding or facilities. In real life, a nuclear program does not spring from someone's imagination into a device. It takes a dedicated team, a facility, and years of applied research. None of those existed in any form after 98, and they barely existed before that.
There was no competent evidence of anny of those assertions. I use that qualifier becuase for about two years prior, Cheney was fixing the record by having all sorts of ridiculous crap from Chalabi's crew put in the official recoird. Read Sen. Graham's account of the caveats on the conclusions that he saw that then were excised from the NIE to be made public. Tenet was a tool - Graham was so POed at him because he was honest to Graham and then would say the opposite publicly. Was the recent revelation that Hadley was writing Tenet's statements the least bit surprising to anyone that had been following the issue? Shouldn't have been
And let's not fall back on the "if he didn't have them now, he would have in the future." I rather doubt that, as he could not have pulled it off given his limited control and resources even if the sanctions regime predictably crumbled, which was Ken Pollack's argument. But that wasn't what was being sold
Some ask how urgent this danger is to America and the world. The danger is already significant, and it only grows worse with time. If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today -- and we do -- does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?
And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons.
This is one of those down the memory hole. Even Powell's embarrassing performance did not rescue it. The facilities that were popped in 98 were not being rebuilt.
And that was the most ridiculous thing he said. That was coming up
We've also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVS for missions targeting the United States.
That was never close to true. They had one tidbit from a Chalabi type on it. But it made no sense. Plainly, Cheney's crew was either incredibly stupid or incredibly demented. No evidence we ever had showed that they had anything close to this technology, much less the ability to get it and contol it anywhere the US mainland. This was pure fakery
Over the years, Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terror organization carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans. Iraq has also provided safe haven to Abu Abbas, who was responsible for seizing the Achille Lauro and killing an American passenger.
This was techically true but idiotic. To think that giving some haven to retired Fatah types to build up cred on the Palestinian issue was somehow evidence of the ability to collborate with AQ is pure Stephen Hayes idiocy
The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his "nuclear mujahideen" -- his nuclear holy warriors. Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
Two outright lies here - the rebuilding facilities and the tubes. The tubes were physically unable to be used as centifuges - the wall thicknesses were all wrong. And we knew that - the DOE was shouting it.
If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.
Of course, this statement reveals that they knew the prior statement was BS - sloppy editing by the speech writers trying to put in something defensible only to have Cheney reinsert the indefensible stuff. Hello - if you can get highly enriched uranium (which still ain't the whole thing), you don't need tubes to enrich plain yellow cake or uranium!! It's plain what occurred, both as a matter of logic and what was occurring in October (see
link to know why the stakes were rising at that time). The yellow cake and tube claims were being shot down. So someone said let just use the hypothetical that he doesn't need to enrich - he gets the enriched uranium.
No need for tons of yellow cake and hundreds of tubes and gigantic easily detectable centrifuging oeration, all of which are easy for others to call BS on - we'll just posit, apropos of nothing, that someone gives it to him. Why we would believe that could occur is beyond reason. But at least its unverifiable, which gives it a leg up in a speech trying to convince a nation to go to war in which ever previously asserted basis was falling apart. But someone, lileky Cheney since we know he did it in other instances, reinserted the discredited stuff because he was so disillusional or just indifferent to truth).
And the case pretty well did originate in the OVP. Actually, to be precise, it became policy there - it originated for ten years prior in PNAC and AEI offices and in the demented mind of Myrjolie. This crap had been peddled for years, but previous leaders did not get suckered in.
Aghain, we turn to the
boasts before the invasion, - see
Hoagland, a sympathizer
One breeze of change came in President Bush's Oct. 7 speech in Cincinnati. Among the terror-related items that were declassified for the speech was an agency finding that Iraq is developing "a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles" to deliver chemical and biological weapons on U.S. targets.
That was new stuff, delivered by a determined and effective CIA collection effort earlier this year. Agency information also allowed the president to assert (accurately) that "Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases."
That's actually old new stuff, stored in CIA files since the mid-1990s. But that intelligence was quietly buried during the Clinton years, when the need not to know very much about Iraq and terrorism was very strong.
This is how war is waged inside the CIA: The upstarts who are challenging the agency's long-standing and deeply flawed analysis of Iraq are being accused of "politicizing intelligence," a label that is a reputation-killer in the intelligence world. It is also a protective shield for analysts who do not want, any more than the rest of us, to acknowledge that they have been profoundly and damagingly mistaken.
Hello? Anyone there?
Before They were proven wrong, they bragged about doing exactly what you say never occurred
And, from
9/17/02 -
TNR
But this is all mere speculation, because there is no NIE for Iraq and there probably won't be one anytime soon. The reason for this omission is that the Iraq hawks running the Pentagon and staffing the office of the vice president long ago lost faith in the CIA analysis. So they set up their own network for analyzing and collecting intelligence regarding Iraq and have been presenting it to the president themselves. The result is that instead of Bush receiving one assessment of the facts on the ground, he has for months been receiving two--one (more cautious) from the CIA and the other (more optimistic) from the Iraq hawks. As one former CIA analyst says, "Not since Vietnam has there been as deep a divide over intelligence as to enemy capabilities as you are seeing now in Iraq." The administration's confusion on Iraq, in other words, goes even deeper than its critics understand. It's not just that different factions in the administration disagree about U.S. policy vis-à-vis Saddam. They disagree about the fundamental facts on which that policy should be based.
And
Judis
CIA analysts also generally endorsed the findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which concluded that, while serious questions remained about Iraq's nuclear program--many having to do with discrepancies in documentation--its present capabilities were virtually nil. The IAEA possessed no evidence that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program and, it seems, neither did U.S. intelligence. In CIA Director George Tenet's January 2002 review of global weapons-technology proliferation, he did not even mention a nuclear threat from Iraq, though he did warn of one from North Korea. The review said only, "We believe that Iraq has probably continued at least low-level theoretical R&D [research and development] associated with its nuclear program." This vague determination didn't reflect any new evidence but merely the intelligence community's assumption that the Iraqi dictator remained interested in building nuclear weapons. Greg Thielmann, the former director for strategic proliferation and military affairs at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), tells The New Republic, "During the time that I was office director, 2000 to 2002, we never assessed that there was good evidence that Iraq was reconstituting or getting really serious about its nuclear weapons program."
The CIA's analysis of Iraq, Perle said, "isn't worth the paper it is written on." In the summer of 2002, Vice President Cheney made several visits to the CIA's Langley headquarters, which were understood within the agency as an attempt to pressure the low-level specialists interpreting the raw intelligence. "That would freak people out," says one former CIA official. "It is supposed to be an ivory tower. And that kind of pressure would be enormous on these young guys."
But the Pentagon found an even more effective way to pressure the agency. In October 2001, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith set up a special intelligence operation in the Pentagon to "think through how the various terrorist organizations relate to each other and ... state sponsors," in Feith's description. Their approach echoed the "Team B" strategy that conservatives had used in the past: establishing a separate entity to offer alternative intelligence analyses to the CIA. Conservatives had done this in 1976, criticizing and intimidating the agency over its estimates of Soviet military strength, and again in 1998, arguing for the necessity of missile defense. (Wolfowitz had participated in both projects; the latter was run by Rumsfeld.) This time, the new entity--headed by Perle protégé Abram Shulsky--reassessed intelligence already collected by the CIA along with information from Iraqi defectors and, as Feith remarked coyly at a press conference earlier this month, "came up with some interesting observations about the linkages between Iraq and Al Qaeda." In August 2002, Feith brought the unit to Langley to brief the CIA about its findings. If the separate intelligence unit wasn't enough to challenge the CIA, Rumsfeld also began publicly discussing the creation of a new Pentagon position, an undersecretary for intelligence, who would rival the CIA director and diminish the authority of the agency.