Should the Pope apologize??
- Thread starter DawnCt1
- Start date
Teejay32 said:
I understand completely. Requiring something like a formal indictment or a conviction in abstensia, aka: paperwork, can be most inconvenient. You're right. You can just forget the inconvenient niceties ............ oh pardon me, you already have.
Teejay32 said:
You see bias - I'd call it the most clear and concise example of rank hypocrisy I've ever seen here. Way cool.
So, according to the article Clinton sent people to other countries to be tortured too, but it's all good, because they got some paperwork signed?
sodaseller
DIS Veteran
- Joined
- Mar 11, 2004
- Messages
- 2,701
I see stupid people.
Rendition to a country that has issued an arrest warrant is required by extradition treaties. It is a function of due process of law, required by our Constitution.
Extarordinary rendition with out any due process to another country to be tortured outside any justice system is more than a horse of a different species, it's a different species from a different galaxy
To suggest that the two are indistinguishable and that the approval the former but not the latter can only be explained by hypocrisy almost defies caricature. I don't think that even the Daily Show could capture the inanity of that statement
Rendition to a country that has issued an arrest warrant is required by extradition treaties. It is a function of due process of law, required by our Constitution.
Extarordinary rendition with out any due process to another country to be tortured outside any justice system is more than a horse of a different species, it's a different species from a different galaxy
To suggest that the two are indistinguishable and that the approval the former but not the latter can only be explained by hypocrisy almost defies caricature. I don't think that even the Daily Show could capture the inanity of that statement
sodaseller
DIS Veteran
- Joined
- Mar 11, 2004
- Messages
- 2,701
On second though, the two are almost indistinguishable
Pretty much the same as
Pretty much the same as
Not long ago, Scheuer, who lives in northern Virginia, spoke openly for the first time about how he and several other top C.I.A. officials set up the program, in the mid-nineties. It was begun in desperation, he told me. At the time, he was the head of the C.I.A.s Islamic-militant unit, whose job was to detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist operations. His unit spent much of 1996 studying how Al Qaeda operated; by the next year, Scheuer said, its mission was to try to capture bin Laden and his associates. He recalled, We went to the White Housewhich was then occupied by the Clinton Administrationand they said, Do it. He added that Richard Clarke, who was in charge of counter-terrorism for the National Security Council, offered no advice. He told me, Figure it out by yourselves, Scheuer said. (Clarke did not respond to a request for comment.)
Scheuer sought the counsel of Mary Jo White, the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, who, along with a small group of F.B.I. agents, was pursuing the 1993 World Trade Center bombing case. In 1998, Whites team obtained an indictment against bin Laden, authorizing U.S. agents to bring him and his associates to the United States to stand trial. From the start, though, the C.I.A. was wary of granting terrorism suspects the due process afforded by American law. The agency did not want to divulge secrets about its intelligence sources and methods, and American courts demand transparency. Even establishing the chain of custody of key evidencesuch as a laptop computercould easily pose a significant problem: foreign governments might refuse to testify in U.S. courts about how they had obtained the evidence, for fear of having their secret coöperation exposed. (Foreign governments often worried about retaliation from their own Muslim populations.) The C.I.A. also felt that other agencies sometimes stood in its way. In 1996, for example, the State Department stymied a joint effort by the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. to question one of bin Ladens cousins in America, because he had a diplomatic passport, which protects the holder from U.S. law enforcement. Describing the C.I.A.s frustration, Scheuer said, We were turning into voyeurs. We knew where these people were, but we couldnt capture them because we had nowhere to take them. The agency realized that we had to come up with a third party.
The obvious choice, Scheuer said, was Egypt. The largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid after Israel, Egypt was a key strategic ally, and its secret police force, the Mukhabarat, had a reputation for brutality. Egypt had been frequently cited by the State Department for torture of prisoners. According to a 2002 report, detainees were stripped and blindfolded; suspended from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just touching the floor; beaten with fists, whips, metal rods, or other objects; subjected to electrical shocks; and doused with cold water [and] sexually assaulted. Hosni Mubarak, Egypts leader, who came to office in 1981, after President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Islamist extremists, was determined to crack down on terrorism. His prime political enemies were radical Islamists, hundreds of whom had fled the country and joined Al Qaeda. Among these was Ayman al-Zawahiri, a physician from Cairo, who went to Afghanistan and eventually became bin Ladens deputy.
In 1995, Scheuer said, American agents proposed the rendition program to Egypt, making clear that it had the resources to track, capture, and transport terrorist suspects globallyincluding access to a small fleet of aircraft. Egypt embraced the idea. What was clever was that some of the senior people in Al Qaeda were Egyptian, Scheuer said. It served American purposes to get these people arrested, and Egyptian purposes to get these people back, where they could be interrogated. Technically, U.S. law requires the C.I.A. to seek assurances from foreign governments that rendered suspects wont be tortured. Scheuer told me that this was done, but he was not sure if any documents confirming the arrangement were signed.
A series of spectacular covert operations followed from this secret pact. On September 13, 1995, U.S. agents helped kidnap Talaat Fouad Qassem, one of Egypts most wanted terrorists, in Croatia. Qassem had fled to Europe after being linked by Egypt to the assassination of Sadat; he had been sentenced to death in absentia. Croatian police seized Qassem in Zagreb and handed him over to U.S. agents, who interrogated him aboard a ship cruising the Adriatic Sea and then took him back to Egypt. Once there, Qassem disappeared. There is no record that he was put on trial. Hossam el-Hamalawy, an Egyptian journalist who covers human-rights issues, said, We believe he was executed.
A more elaborate operation was staged in Tirana, Albania, in the summer of 1998. According to the Wall Street Journal, the C.I.A. provided the Albanian intelligence service with equipment to wiretap the phones of suspected Muslim militants. Tapes of the conversations were translated into English, and U.S. agents discovered that they contained lengthy discussions with Zawahiri, bin Ladens deputy. The U.S. pressured Egypt for assistance; in June, Egypt issued an arrest warrant for Shawki Salama Attiya, one of the militants. Over the next few months, according to the Journal, Albanian security forces, working with U.S. agents, killed one suspect and captured Attiya and four others. These men were bound, blindfolded, and taken to an abandoned airbase, then flown by jet to Cairo for interrogation. Attiya later alleged that he suffered electrical shocks to his genitals, was hung from his limbs, and was kept in a cell in filthy water up to his knees. Two other suspects, who had been sentenced to death in absentia, were hanged.
On August 5, 1998, an Arab-language newspaper in London published a letter from the International Islamic Front for Jihad, in which it threatened retaliation against the U.S. for the Albanian operationin a language they will understand. Two days later, the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were blown up, killing two hundred and twenty-four people.
The U.S. began rendering terror suspects to other countries, but the most common destination remained Egypt. The partnership between the American and the Egyptian intelligence services was extraordinarily close: the Americans could give the Egyptian interrogators questions they wanted put to the detainees in the morning, Scheuer said, and get answers by the evening. The Americans asked to question suspects directly themselves, but, Scheuer said, the Egyptians refused. We were never in the same room at the same time.
Scheuer sought the counsel of Mary Jo White, the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, who, along with a small group of F.B.I. agents, was pursuing the 1993 World Trade Center bombing case. In 1998, Whites team obtained an indictment against bin Laden, authorizing U.S. agents to bring him and his associates to the United States to stand trial. From the start, though, the C.I.A. was wary of granting terrorism suspects the due process afforded by American law. The agency did not want to divulge secrets about its intelligence sources and methods, and American courts demand transparency. Even establishing the chain of custody of key evidencesuch as a laptop computercould easily pose a significant problem: foreign governments might refuse to testify in U.S. courts about how they had obtained the evidence, for fear of having their secret coöperation exposed. (Foreign governments often worried about retaliation from their own Muslim populations.) The C.I.A. also felt that other agencies sometimes stood in its way. In 1996, for example, the State Department stymied a joint effort by the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. to question one of bin Ladens cousins in America, because he had a diplomatic passport, which protects the holder from U.S. law enforcement. Describing the C.I.A.s frustration, Scheuer said, We were turning into voyeurs. We knew where these people were, but we couldnt capture them because we had nowhere to take them. The agency realized that we had to come up with a third party.
The obvious choice, Scheuer said, was Egypt. The largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid after Israel, Egypt was a key strategic ally, and its secret police force, the Mukhabarat, had a reputation for brutality. Egypt had been frequently cited by the State Department for torture of prisoners. According to a 2002 report, detainees were stripped and blindfolded; suspended from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just touching the floor; beaten with fists, whips, metal rods, or other objects; subjected to electrical shocks; and doused with cold water [and] sexually assaulted. Hosni Mubarak, Egypts leader, who came to office in 1981, after President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Islamist extremists, was determined to crack down on terrorism. His prime political enemies were radical Islamists, hundreds of whom had fled the country and joined Al Qaeda. Among these was Ayman al-Zawahiri, a physician from Cairo, who went to Afghanistan and eventually became bin Ladens deputy.
In 1995, Scheuer said, American agents proposed the rendition program to Egypt, making clear that it had the resources to track, capture, and transport terrorist suspects globallyincluding access to a small fleet of aircraft. Egypt embraced the idea. What was clever was that some of the senior people in Al Qaeda were Egyptian, Scheuer said. It served American purposes to get these people arrested, and Egyptian purposes to get these people back, where they could be interrogated. Technically, U.S. law requires the C.I.A. to seek assurances from foreign governments that rendered suspects wont be tortured. Scheuer told me that this was done, but he was not sure if any documents confirming the arrangement were signed.
A series of spectacular covert operations followed from this secret pact. On September 13, 1995, U.S. agents helped kidnap Talaat Fouad Qassem, one of Egypts most wanted terrorists, in Croatia. Qassem had fled to Europe after being linked by Egypt to the assassination of Sadat; he had been sentenced to death in absentia. Croatian police seized Qassem in Zagreb and handed him over to U.S. agents, who interrogated him aboard a ship cruising the Adriatic Sea and then took him back to Egypt. Once there, Qassem disappeared. There is no record that he was put on trial. Hossam el-Hamalawy, an Egyptian journalist who covers human-rights issues, said, We believe he was executed.
A more elaborate operation was staged in Tirana, Albania, in the summer of 1998. According to the Wall Street Journal, the C.I.A. provided the Albanian intelligence service with equipment to wiretap the phones of suspected Muslim militants. Tapes of the conversations were translated into English, and U.S. agents discovered that they contained lengthy discussions with Zawahiri, bin Ladens deputy. The U.S. pressured Egypt for assistance; in June, Egypt issued an arrest warrant for Shawki Salama Attiya, one of the militants. Over the next few months, according to the Journal, Albanian security forces, working with U.S. agents, killed one suspect and captured Attiya and four others. These men were bound, blindfolded, and taken to an abandoned airbase, then flown by jet to Cairo for interrogation. Attiya later alleged that he suffered electrical shocks to his genitals, was hung from his limbs, and was kept in a cell in filthy water up to his knees. Two other suspects, who had been sentenced to death in absentia, were hanged.
On August 5, 1998, an Arab-language newspaper in London published a letter from the International Islamic Front for Jihad, in which it threatened retaliation against the U.S. for the Albanian operationin a language they will understand. Two days later, the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were blown up, killing two hundred and twenty-four people.
The U.S. began rendering terror suspects to other countries, but the most common destination remained Egypt. The partnership between the American and the Egyptian intelligence services was extraordinarily close: the Americans could give the Egyptian interrogators questions they wanted put to the detainees in the morning, Scheuer said, and get answers by the evening. The Americans asked to question suspects directly themselves, but, Scheuer said, the Egyptians refused. We were never in the same room at the same time.
Teejay32
<font color=green>Wanders off too much<br>
- Joined
- Jan 18, 2000
- Messages
- 4,053
LuvDuke said:
You could say Bush took an existing practice and pushed it to the point of ridiculousness, but you're not doing that, you're saying proper paperwork makes the practice legit. It's not inconvenient, it is irrelevant and damn silly if you're campaigning against torture. That was a tool used to track down al-Qaeda during the end of the Clinton years - he didn't want suspects brought to the US, he had nowhere to put them outside of the US, and he wanted the information out of them. So in practice: CIA personnel capture suspects in Albania or Croatia, and ship them or drop them off in Egypt, and the two intelligence agencies are partnered. Extraordinary rendition.
sodaseller
DIS Veteran
- Joined
- Mar 11, 2004
- Messages
- 2,701
Then it looks like it may have happened then as it happened now. But to argue that legal rendition is the same as extraordinary rendition and that due process is just "paperwork", some technical distinction, remains one of the stupidest arguments ever seen on this board. According to the ACLU, the process occurred under the Clinton Administration but was limited then.bsnyder said:
And if you think that your description is the difference, you're a fool, not that that wasn't already apparent. There are procedures set out in the US Code that must be folowed
Teejay32 said:
Of course, indictments, trials, evidence ............ it's all so silly when we're fighting terrorists who hate our freedoms.
So let me see if I understand this new development in critical thinking. Now, it turns out, Clinton really did do "something" instead of ignoring terrorism. Oops, don't let that get around. It might torpedo the Republican line: "Nothing was done for 8 years under Clinton." Right, absolutely nothing except indictments, trials, convictions, sentencing and legal extradition.
Btw, this also happened during the Clinton years:
President wants Senate to hurry with new anti-terrorism laws
July 30, 1996
http://www.cnn.com/US/9607/30/clinton.terrorism/
More of that "did nothing" during the Clinton years.
And on that happy note, I think I'll exit this thread. The Pope apologized, the rioting quieted down, Mecca is still standing, etc.
Plus this horse is not only dead, it has been beaten into unrecognizable pulp. Ta Ta.
Plus this horse is not only dead, it has been beaten into unrecognizable pulp. Ta Ta.
sodaseller
DIS Veteran
- Joined
- Mar 11, 2004
- Messages
- 2,701
I never realized that obtuseness and dishonesty were signs of maturityTeejay32 said:
Share this page
-
What To Do on a Disney Day When Everything Goes Wrong
-
How To Plan Disney on a Tight Budget Without Missing Out
-
2026 V.I.PASSHOLDER Summer Days Announced at Disney World
-
New Disney Cruise Funnel Collectibles Come With a Frustrating Catch
-
NEW Winnie the Pooh Dress (and More!) at EPCOT's UK Pavilion
-
The Perfect Special Gift for a Disney Fan Going on Vacation
-
NEW Reveal: 2026 runDisney Virtual Series Medals Go Retro
Disney Vacation Planning. Free. Done for You.
Our Authorized Disney Vacation Planners are here to provide personalized, expert advice, answer every question, and uncover the best discounts.
Let Dreams Unlimited Travel take care of all the details, so you can sit back, relax, and enjoy a stress-free vacation.
Start Your Disney Vacation
