Nobody here in southern Louisiana has forgotten the gulf oil spill.
"Better management by BP, Halliburton and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the blowout by improving the ability of individuals involved to identify the risks they faced, and to properly evaluate, communicate and address them," the report says. "A blowout in deepwater was not a statistical inevitability."
The report doesn't offer any new findings about what led to the blowout. It repeats the well-worn theory that
a series of human missteps caused the accident, and that the massive stack of shut-off valves on the sea floor called the blowout preventer suffered various mechanical failures.
But the report does more than others to put BP's management decisions into the larger context of an extremely difficult drilling project that should have caused BP and others to exercise far more caution. Instead, BP went on to make a string of "compromises" that placed prioritized ease and speed, not safety, the commission concluded.
The commission questioned BP's true commitment to the safety centralizers were supposed to provide, saying its approach was summed up by this April 16 e-mail from one BP engineer to another: "Who cares, it's done, end of story, will probably be fine and we'll get a good cement job."
In possibly the most fatal error of them all, BP's Kaluza and the Transocean drilling crew blatantly misinterpreted the so-called "negative pressure test," the industry-recognized best method for making sure oil and gas aren't leaking into the well and, the commission report says, the "only test performed that would have checked the integrity of the bottom-hole cement job." Pressure in two places in the hole that should have both been zero instead read zero in one spot and 1,400 pounds per square inch in the other. Transocean workers may have tried to explain away the difference as a product of an effect they'd heard about, but that most experts say is a myth. The different readings "could only have been caused by a leak into the well," the commission concluded, and yet BP ordered no further testing and took the negative test results to mean there was no leak.
From there, several other safety mechanisms failed, most importantly the blowout preventer. But the die had been cast by the buildup of risk from the series of managerial decisions leading up to the actual blowout.
"BP's fundamental mistake was its failure ... to exercise special caution (and, accordingly, to direct its contractors to be especially vigilant) before relying on the primary cement as a barrier to hydrocarbon (oil and gas) flow," the commission report said.
12/30/2010
Reader comment: BP better well clean up in front of my house
"BP better well clean up in front of my house. I live on Grand Isle. and I check the beach each day. The tar balls are still coming in each day . Some days are worse than others. I HAVE BEEN told by the workers that they think that they have a job till Easter. It will be necessary for a small crew to stay active for the rest of my life and beyond. For 10 years before the BIG SPILL it was very hard to find a tar ball on Grand Isle. I have lived there for the last 20 years, and I go on the beach almost every day. In the 1950s there were tar balls on the beach. Since then the industry has cleaned up its act. I know because I worked in the oil patch for 30 years. I worked over water in the inside lakes."
Tar balls still being cleaned off Grand Isle beaches
Published: Thursday, January 06, 2011, 8:15 PM
"...The inescapable conclusion of the oil spill hearings and commissions is that there was a profound disregard for and absence of sound (let alone best) management, engineering and systems practices. As the on-going investigations and reporting indicate, many of the proximate and root causes of the Macando well's performance deficiencies are still not understood.
"In the face of such deep uncertainty and the calamitous consequences of being wrong, the public's interests in exploiting its energy resources near its homes and jobs is to proceed with a level of prudence and caution not found in the self-serving world of wildcatting risk-takers who drive the energy business...."